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Experiencing Practical Knowledge




1 “Pragmatism and sociology” observed Émile Durkheim in 1914, share “a sense of life and
action.  Both are  children of  the same era” (Durkheim 1983:  1).  This  assumption has
gained ground in current social science and humanities discourse, in particular in France
and Germany, a development I shall examine below. Following the skepticism of post-
modernism, both practice theory and pragmatism are undergoing a renaissance that can
be seen not least  in the so-called epistemological  turns of  the past decade.  Thus the
“practice turn” of the 1990s was followed by the “pragmatic turn” of the beginning of the
21st  century internationally  in  social  and cultural  sciences  as  well  as  in  philosophy.
Despite the obvious convergences of both traditions of thought, there has not yet been a
systematic  analysis  of  their  epistemological  convergences.1 This  essay  addresses  this
desideratum through a  comparative  analysis  of  the  sociologists  Émile  Durkheim and
Pierre Bourdieu and the philosophers William James and John Dewey. Without a doubt,
these four protagonists are different in many respects.  Durkheim rejected the vitalist
principles that characterized James’ pragmatism and radical empiricism, and Bourdieu
did  not embrace  Dewey’s  political  optimism  about  social  and  cognitive  spaces  of
opportunity that could potentially support social change towards a more democratic and
humane society. It seems it is exactly these distinctions that differentiated sociology from
pragmatism from the very beginning and that, at least in francophone countries, long
hindered  pragmatism  from  gaining  the  recognition  and  attention  in  Europe  that  it
deserved. The situation in Germany was not much better until Hans Joas has introduced
American pragmatism into German sociological theory. At the same time, no connections
were made between pragmatism and the epistemological foundations of Pierre Bourdieu’s
practice theory, which the late Frankfurter School saw as utilitarian cultural sociology
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(Honneth 1984, Joas & Knöbl 2004); practice theory’s call for the creation of theory based
on experience and empirical reflection was applied anything but stringently. 
2 The French neo-pragmatic movement under the label of the “sociologie pragmatique de
la critique” was constituted in the early 1990’s notably by ex-scholars of Bourdieu against
his sociology, or, more precisely, against the structuralist heritage in his conception of
the habitus. On the other hand, and without making it explicit, it reinforced Bourdieu’s
practical epistemology through an ethnomethodological and actor-centered perspective,
that  had obviously inspired Bourdieu’s own practice as  a  researcher,  but  was widely
neglected in his theoretical  architecture.  Moreover and curiously enough, the French
pragmatic movement was itself not originated by a reception of the American classics. In
a way, these inconsistencies contributed to the general idea that pragmatism and practice
theory  have  not  much  in  common.  However  in  the  meantime,  over  ten  years  after
Bourdieu’s death, today it is again possible to take up the idea of Bourdieu’s practice
theory free of the former Parisian trench fighting (Boltanski 2008,  2009;  De Fornel &
Ogien 2011) and at the same time systematically re-read James’ and Dewey’s writings (De
Fornel & Lemieux 2007; Karsenti 2007) and conceptualize them anew for the sociological
theory of knowledge (Thévenot 2011). This is the impulse I have followed. 
3 Practice,  in James’  and Dewey’s pragmatism, as well as in Durkheim’s and Bourdieu’s
sociology,  signifies  first  of  all  an anthropological  category.  Its  material,  physical  and
cognitive complexity is that it refers equally to contradictory states ever-present in homo
duplex:  difference  and  repetition,  creation  and  reproduction,  action  and  reflection,
volatility and stability. This definition of practice contrasts – particularly explicitly in
Dewey and Bourdieu’s writings – on an epistemological level with a reason-centered and
universalistic  concept  of  humanity  that  was  again  radically  questioned  by  the  post-
modern  ideas  of  the  1990s.  At  the  same  time,  this  concept  nevertheless  created  an
awareness of  the considerable power of  institutions and structures both to reinforce
social inequality and to question its internalization and modification through practice.
“Practice” is at the same time the critical counterpart to “theory,” provided that the
latter  is  not  hypostatized  as  the  origin  of  knowledge.  The  creation  of  a  dichotomy
between theory and practice is already the starting point of all four authors’ critiques of
consciousness considering the philosophy and humanities of their respective times. In
this  sense,  the  term practice  is  very  close  to  concepts  of  “experience”  (in  Bourdieu
“disposition”),  “knowledge”  and  “emergence”  –  an  idea  that  already  informed
Durkheim’s thought and also allows for a connection between pragmatism and practice
theory as I shall suggest below.
4 My assumption is that an interpretation – based on emergence theory – of the categories
central to both these schools; experience/disposition, knowledge and practice shall make
an explicit combination of pragmatism and a sociological theory of practice possible that
has not yet been attempted and that takes into account both socio-structural limits and
contingent and optional spaces of possibility. In my use of the practice-oriented term
“emergence,” I use Wolfgang Krohn and Günther Küppers’ definition: the appearance of a
new quality characterized by a specific “self-organized dynamic of process” (Krohn &
Küppers  1992:  7-8)2 considering the fact,  that,  as  Neil  Gross  points  out,  “pragmatists
suggest that means and ends are not always given prior to action […], but are instead
often emergent from action. […] This is especially the case in situations of ambiguity,
which pragmatism is uniquely poised to make sense of” (Gross 2009: 367). This processual
dynamic is especially important to the prominence of practice in terms of its ability to
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form reality, its creative force, central to both practice theory and experimental thinking.
For James and for Dewey, as well as for Bourdieu, knowledge is a mode of practical action
based on the fundamental rejection of an essentialist point of reference divorced from
action. They were interested in the dynamics of human action as a practical construction
of the social. I therefore take a particularly close look at James’ and Durkheim’s theories
of knowledge and action and the meaning of (collective) “experience” (1). I then compare
the  terms  “experience”  and  “practice”  in  the  philosophy  of  John  Dewey  and  Pierre
Bourdieu’s  theory  of  knowledge  and society  (2).  Finally,  I  shall  make  an  attempt  to
explain why conceptualizing these approaches using a theory of emergence is important
for a pragmatist theory of practice that is yet to be developed (3).
 
1. Modern Critiques of Consciousness in France and
the USA: Durkheim’s “sociologie de l’action” and
James’ “Radical Empiricism”
5 At the start of the twentieth century, Émile Durkheim elevated sociology to a discipline
that, not incidentally, in France oscillated between scientific positivism and metaphysical
philosophy. This new French discipline could only gain as philosophy and the natural
sciences vied for interpretative supremacy. Durkheim’s anti-fundamentalist criticism of
teleological metaphysics on the one hand and empirical determinism on the other hand
sparked passionate debates at the turn of the century on how best to grasp the societal
challenges of the modern era.  This is the point at which Durkheim’s empirical  social
science  connects  with  American  pragmatism  and  which  accentuates  his  sociological
method. Durkheim’s claim to a completely new social science, genetically and empirically,
has a worthy opponent in William James’ pragmatism and radical empiricism. 
6 Durkheim’s lectures on pragmatism, held in the winter of 1913/14, but first published in
1955  from  students’  notes,  were  a  reaction  to  three  questions  articulated  by the
pragmatist movement: 1) The meaning of experience for the constitution of social reality,
2) The centrality of action and practice to gaining knowledge and, finally, 3) The search for
a method to gauge the relationship between empirical facts and individual and collective
consciousness.  According to Hans Joas and the French philosopher Bruno Karsenti,  the
importance of Durkheim’s pragmatism lectures as a component of his sociologie de l’action
has  been  underestimated  to  date.  Thus  both  sociology  and  pragmatism  made  an
important early contribution to practice theory, most recently discussed in the context of
the so-called practice turn (Karsenti 2006: 162-3; Karsenti 2007: 139). 
7 The  pragmatists’  epistemological  interest  arose  from  an  underlying  anthropological
assumption;3 that humans can be distinguished from animals by their reduced instincts.
As a result, they meet crisis situations with neither a universally given nor internalized
spectrum of action, but rather must experiment. In his well-known 1878 essay “How to
make our ideas clear,” C. S. Peirce founded pragmatism as an epistemological semiotics
and a means of clarifying the practical significance of terminology. Peirce, James and
Dewey were searching for methodological connecting points between natural sciences
and philosophical epistemology. The problem with philosophy, as Dewey in particular
never tired of saying, is its insistence on metaphysically founded absolute certainty from
which  it  defended  its  dominance  in  the  humanities  in  the  face  of  the  growing
omnipresence of the natural sciences. The philosophy of pragmatism on the other hand,
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was based on the underlying assumption that both quotidian and scientific knowledge is
based  primarily  on  experience  and  practice.  Knowledge  represents  therefore  a
hypothetical endeavor, while practice has both a creative and an experimental character.
For James, John Dewey summarized James’ accomplishment in this context as follows: “In
brief,  James’s  theory  is  replacing  the  traditional  concept  of  absolute  truth  with
experimentalism” (MW 12: 220). 
8 The sociologist  Durkheim was skeptical  about this  epistemological  optimism. For one
thing,  he  doubted the existence of  unfettered possibilities  espoused by experimental
thinking,  he  rather  believed  in  constrictive  social  norms;  he  also  found  that  the
pragmatists ignored the importance of history by their emphasis on the new social spaces
of  possibility opened up by the modern era,  the structural  framework of  which was
equally created and limited by the freedom of the human will (Durkheim 1982: 134-5).
James believed these spaces of possibility were based on experiences in the world and of
the world in which old truths and new experiences collaborate, a particular focus of his
radical empiricism. James’ pragmatism sought in the end to ensure the connection of
truth and usefulness. While Peirce’s “pragmaticism,” as he later renamed his philosophy
to  distinguish  it  from  James’,  concentrated  on  applying  mathematical  logic  to
philosophical knowledge in order to introduce it to philosophy through an experimental
method of abduction – building hypotheses – as a “laboratory habit of mind,” James, a
psychologist, applied naturalist methods to practice-based cognition. A polemic against
both rationalism and (particularly Humean) empiricism, pragmatism aimed also to refer
to a basic method of thinking; both a theory of reality and a genetic theory of truth. The
pragmatic  method  should  act  as  an  intermediary  between  different  perspectives,
highlighting their transformative elements, as James explained in 1907 in “Pragmatism”:
It is thus an “indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed. Theories
become thus instruments,  not answers to enigmas, in  which we can rest. We won’t lie upon
them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid” (James
1978: 32). Similar to Durkheim’s sociology, pragmatists are in opposition to all essentialist
tendencies  in  the  philosophical  tradition  that  divided  the  empirical  from  theory.
Durkheim’s sociology is also instrumental and interventionist; not only in terms of its
methodological approach but also in terms of its practical function – in two senses a
sociologie de l’action. But how do James’ philosophy and Durkheim’s sociology correspond
in regard to their respective aims?
 
1.1 Experience and Collective Consciousness
9 The following examination of Durkheim’s comments on pragmatism elucidates the way in
which Durkheim was able to hone his original sociological arguments by grappling with
James. The term “experience“ is central to both; as a new critique of consciousness it is
one of the most important paradigms in the modern humanities. Bruno Karsenti observes
that Durkheim’s “opposition to pragmatism [is] […] just as clear as to Kantianism and
empiricism. However it makes the relentlessness and the specificity of Durkheim’s thesis
clear, which attempts to prevail against the challenges of a theory, which itself acted
similarly at its onset, by overcoming both classical theoretical trends by redefining ‘experience.’
Accordingly  one could ask  whether  [Durkheim’s]  socio-empiricism is  not  primarily  a
sociological version of ‘radical empiricism’” (Karsenti 2007: 134).4
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10 Karsenti is referring here to the lectures on pragmatism and to Durkheim’s studies on the
sociology of religion which for some time have been discussed in France and in the USA as
“socio-empiricism” in regards to the impulses they provided for practice theory (Rawls
1996;  De  Fornel  &  Lemieux  2007).  Both  James  and  Durkheim phrase  their  humanist
critique  of  consciousness  as  a  radical  empiricist  attack  on  metaphysical  ideas  of
consciousness: “Truth thus means, according to humanism, the relation of less fixed parts
of  experience  (predicates)  to  other  relatively  fixed  parts  (subjects);  and  we  are  not
required to seek it in a relation of experience as such to anything beyond itself” (James
1975: 212). James’ radical empiricism thus refers primarily the attempt to bring together
the process of the relation of experiences with the demands of any given reality; or to
connect rational and empirical thought.5 In his famous 1904 essay “Does consciousness
exist?” James even goes so far as to take complete leave of the term “consciousness” in
favor of its “pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience.” However, since this thought
appears absurd to him he adds: 
that I  mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity,  but to insist most
emphatically  that  it  does  stand  for  a  function.  […]  [T]here  is  a  function  in
experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality
of being is invoked. That function is knowing. (James 1922: 3-4)
11 Radical  empiricism  as  a  critique  of  consciousness  seeks  to  debunk  the  underlying
ontological  assumption  of  an  absolute  origin  of  consciousness,  as  David  Lapoujade
emphasizes: 
To free the self from the assignation to an origin at the same time frees human
action from an organizational plan hidden in nature, with the mind subjugated to
its  effects.  There  is  no  plan  other  than  the  organizational  plan  of  experience.
(Lapoujade 2008: 185)
12 Seen this way, both radical empiricism and Durkheim aspire to connect to the Lebenswelt
(life-world), however Durkheim doubts that it is possible to capture consciousness within
social reality using James’ at the same time abstract and subject-oriented terminology of
“pure experience” or the “stream of experience.” He criticizes James’ vitalist approach, a
criticism he also aims at his French competitors Gabriel Tarde and Henri Bergson. Similar
to Bergson,  the pragmatists,  according to Durkheim, postulate a reverse evolution in
which the simplest life form is differentiated and individual and the highest life form is
commingling and life-flow. He in contrast sees differentiation of both organic and social
life as proof that “creative development” (Bergson) goes in the other direction: from the
primitive  state  of  commingling to  the  current  (modern)  state  of  differentiation.  The
respective central terms – the “stream of experience” (James following Bergson) and the
“social  fact”  (Durkheim)  mirror  this  fundamental  difference,  further  ignited  by
Durkheim’s desire to distance himself from psychology – James’ origins – as well as his
claim  to  an  objective  sociology.6 Whereas  pure  experience  as  an  “experience  of
actualities” (Lapoujade 2008: 184) is always in the process of becoming, a social fact is also
governed by process,  but it  is the result of differentiation, in particular of the social
division of labor. The respective understanding of practice is similar; in Durkheim it is
based  on  a  theory  of  differentiation  and  is  not  holistic  as  in  pragmatism.  The
“organizational  plan  of  experience”  (Lapoujade)  is  for  Durkheim  also  primarily  an
external factor; it develops within the framework of a collective consciousness which both
acts upon the individual and at the same time is created by him. This dual character of
experiencing and producing mirrors Durkheim’s underlying assumption of homo duplex,
whose irreducible social self culminates as “collective representation” in the ”social fact“,
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in  the  “association”  or  even in  the  “crystallization of  social  phenomena from social
currents”  (Durkheim  1981:  173;  Durkheim  1954:  433).  This  genealogical  culmination
results from an understanding of the social as sui generis, institutionalized within specific
social milieus.7
13 Durkheim’s sociology oscillates between this processual perspective and an emphasis on
the structuring power of  social  and conventional  norms (Durkheim 1953:  24-5;  Lukes
1973: 10; Sawyer 2005: 103-4). This oscillation distinguishes both the contradictoriness
and the complexity of Durkheim’s thought and also makes it thoroughly plausible that he
was  influenced by  both  Bergson and James,  as  this  passage  from “Sociology  and its
scientific  domain”  (1900)  shows,  a  reply  to  Georg  Simmel’s  essay  “Das  Gebiet  der
Soziologie” (the field of sociology): 
Without a doubt phenomena concerning structure are somewhat more stable than
functional phenomena, but there are only gradual differences between these two
orders of facts. Structure itself can only be grasped in becoming and we can only
see  it  as  evident  by  taking  into  account  the  process  of  becoming.  Structure  is
ceaselessly built up and broken down, it is life that has reached a certain degree of
consolidation and to separate it from the life from which it has come or the life
which  determines  it  is  equivalent  to  taking  apart  that  which  is  inseparable.
(Durkheim 1975: 22)
14 R. Keith Sawyer correspondingly makes out the following forms of social emergence in
Durkheim’s oeuvre: “1. The crystallization of social phenomena from social currents. 2.
The historical perspective of a social stage from a social milieu, 3.  The emergence of
collective  representations  from  the  social  milieu”  (Sawyer  2005:  123).8 Collective
experience  is  primarily  important  for  the  practice  theory  dimension  of  Durkheim’s
conceptual thought because it  reflects the functional interdependence of “impersonal
norms  of  thought”  and  social  practices  (Durkheim  1975:  30;  Karsenti  2006:  195f.).
Durkheim, as a reaction to the accusation that his sociology was similar to Hobbes’ or
Machiavelli’s power theories, holds up the emergent character of collective experience –
in  his  “Rules”  already  linked  to  the  term  “association”:  “But  if,  contrary  to  these
philosophers, we say that social life is natural, it is not because we find its origin in the
nature of the individual; it is because it derives directly from the collective being which
is,  of  itself  a  nature  sui  generis;  it  is  because  it  arises  from  that  special  process  of
elaboration which individual consciousness undergo through their association with each
other  and  whence  evolves  a  new  form  of  existence”  (Durkheim  1982:  144).  Sawyer
trenchantly  remarked  on  the  place  of  consciousness  in  this  context:  “Collective
representations  are  of  qualitatively  different  nature  than  individual  representations
because they are emergent  social  facts” (Sawyer 2005:  106).  Therefore the collective,
external to the individual person, marks the impossibility of reducing the social to the
individual subject. 
15 Durkheim’s sociologie de l’action thus positions itself as an emergence theory alternative to
radical empiricism in which experience and consciousness are historically saturated due
to  their  collectivity  –  for  Durkheim the  central  characteristic  of  the  modern  era.  If
experience and consciousness are equally central to the constitution of reality for both
Durkheim’s sociology and James’ philosophy of pragmatism, what role does practice play?
Here I arrive at the core of Durkheim’s criticism of pragmatism, on the basis of which the
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1.2 Practice: Action and Knowledge
16 In his sociophysiological studies, Durkheim uses both the terms “action” and “practice.”
His  professor  and  supporter  in  Bordeaux,  Alfred  Espinas,  had  already  introduced
praxéologie as a sociological theory of practice in 1897 (Espinas 1897: 8-9, Filloux 1987:
45-6, Durkheim 1969: 296). James’ definition of the term practice on the other hand is
greatly influenced by Peirce and signifies an epistemological  category the purpose of
which is not quite clear, as John Dewey criticized in his 1907 essay “What pragmatism
means  by  practical.”  For  James  practice  is  a  distinguishing  attribute  of  an  assumed
measure of the truth of a statement, although it refers to the hypothetical character of
every truth.  Truths,  as faits  accomplis,  are not a priori  concepts,  but are made.  Their
characteristics are not static, but dynamic and practical (MW 4: 98 ff., Durkheim 1981:
125). This instrumental thought is based on the one hand on an analogy with natural
sciences and on the other hand on a concept of experience to which James imparts, as to
consciousness, a functional importance for acquiring knowledge. This analogy is clear in
the term “experimental thought” that, similar to the French expérimentation subsumes
experiment, experience and mental movement. Empiricism is connected with life-worldly
and scientific experience, to which a mentalist advantage is given, and now can also be
applied methodologically.  Dewey remarks on this:  “I  believe we can say […] that the
development of  the idea of  experience to which James more than pointed,  which he
initiated for us, constitutes a revolutionary change in traditional empiricism” (LW 15: 13).
Thus “practice” in pragmatism means above all turning away from metaphysical ideas of
truth and toward a life-worldly reality (James 1975: 278-9). For this reason, James sees an
inseparable  connection  between  practice  and  knowledge.  This  connection  is  created
cognitively  by  experience.  Because  thought  and  reality  are  never  completely  in
concordance, experience has the reality-stabilizing function of bridging this gulf. This
fundamental critique of Humes’ empiricism, Kant’s a priori and the Cartesian cogito is at
the same time the foundation for pragmatism’s attempt to rehabilitate practice;  only
when the individual elements of experience (James 1922: 63-4) have become manifest as
practice in the Lebenswelt do they create that what Lapoujade termed the “organizational
plan” that no longer needs an a priori origin. 
17 Durkheim rejects this theory in its entirety – he sees no affinity between practice and
knowledge as they serve completely different functions (Durkheim 1981: 166-7, Thévenot
2006:  190-1).  Whereas  James  and  Dewey  see  “practice”  as  a  variable,  a  contingent,
experimental category that questions existing patterns of behavior and ways of thinking,
meant to withstand the danger of a philosophy divorced from life; Durkheim (and later
also  Bourdieu)  emphasizes  its  repetitive,  stabilizing,  compulsory  and  collectivizing
aspects which allow individuals only a “relative autonomy” (Durkheim 1953: 23).9 Like
James, he speaks of an experimental method (Durkheim 1982: 110), but one that differs
from all other social sciences – and thus also the philosophy of pragmatism: “The manner
in which society is constituted is one thing, how it acts is something completely different.
These are two kinds of realities, so different that they cannot be researched using the
same procedures and must be separated from one another” (Durkheim 1975: 22). It is this
methodological  separation that,  in a second step necessary to sociology,  first  enables
putting societal practice and general science into the right relationship to one another:
“It is true that science can only concern itself with the facts through the mediation of art,
but  art  is  only  the  extension  of  science”  (Durkheim 1982:  87).10 According  to  Anne
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W. Rawls, this argument stems from a theory of practice: “For Durkheim, social practices
are not ideal and they do not consist primarily of ideas, representations and beliefs. These
are merely secondary phenomena. For Durkheim, society consists first and foremost of
enacted practices that give rise to real social forces that participants in the assembled
group experience jointly”  (Rawls  1996:  434).  At  the same time,  Durkheim’s  theory is
hardly  a  bottom-up  perspective,  as  Rawls  asserts  using  an  interactionist  and
ethnomethodological  approach.  Durkheim’s  definition  of  practice  –  though  never
explicitly stated – is rather situated at the threshold of stability and change that produces
the  act  of  association  and  its  crystallization  as  a  practical,  emergent  phenomenon
(Durkheim  1953:  30).  This  is  particularly  clear  in  the  understanding  of  practice  in
Durkheim’s  late sociology of  religion in which he describes the act  of  believing as  a
disposition to act, expressed both in creative (éffervescence,  délir) and in everyday acts.
This, according to Karsenti, is the important practice theory core of Durkheim’s thought:
“In other words, the sociological vision never resolves the tension between creation and
institutionalization and this is the context in which it poses the question of practice”
(Karsenti  2006:  208).  According  to  Durkheim,  the  relation  of  thought  to  reality  is
therefore  “a  practical  relationship”  (Karsenti  2007:  135).  The  contingency  of  social
practices  led  him  to  the  fundamental  anthropological  belief  in  the  duality  of
consciousness  and  action,  assuming  a  homo  duplex.  From  Durkheim’s  viewpoint,
consciousness and action are not to be treated on the same ontological plane on which his
anti-utilitarian rebuttal of supposed pragmatist utilitarianism is founded – the emergence
theory critique of an intentional category of practice, guided by free will.11 Durkheim
replaces  the  reciprocal  relationship  of  thought  and  action  based  on  the  underlying
assumption  of  the  “reverse  evolution”  that  he  imputes  to  Pragmatism  with  a
psychological theory of differentiation, as Karsenti explains: “[I]t is about understanding
imbalance as a pause in movement, which causes thought to emerge and not thought as
the trigger of a compensating movement” (Karsenti 2007a: 139). According to Durkheim,
consciousness  requires  the  suspension  of  action  in  order  to  unfold  at  all.  Following
Karsenti,  this  is  a  “process  of  the  idealization  of  objects  through  which  they  are
transformed.  Such a  process  is  in  one sense  creative,  in  the  measure  to  which it  is
collective” (Karsenti  2007a:  138).  This  is  clear  not  only  in the “Elementary Forms of
Religious Life” (Durkheim 1954: 16ff.), but also already in the ”Rules” (Durkheim 1982:
39f.) and in Durkheim’s writings on individual and collective beliefs, in which he applies
emergence theory to the relation between experience, practice and knowledge (Durkheim
1953).  Far from negating practice as constituting knowledge, in Durkheim’s view it is
exactly the process of turning practice into non-practice which is the precondition for
knowledge; “a singular practice of thinking, a practice of suspending practice” (Karsenti
2007a: 140).
18 In sum it  can be said that  Durkheim’s  epistemology oscillates  greatly between social
holism on the one hand and a theory of differentiation on the other hand which makes
the emergence theory centrality  of  association plausible.  In  order  to  establish social
holism (i.e. to grasp it in its complexity) it is important to examine the dualism of action
and knowledge and then resolve this dualism though a theory of emergence in the social
as sui generis. James no longer needs this dualism. His work is characterized by a complete
break with the positivist epistemological position, replaced in radical empiricism by an
emergent  phenomenology  of  associated  experiences.  While  Durkheim  therefore  still
needs the dualist opposition of rationalism and empiricism to introduce his sociological
method as a way of reconciling them, James positions himself apart from this dualism.
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James’  and Durkheim’s theories differ in their empiricist  radicalism. While Durkheim
defends this radicalism by setting his sociological method against a knowledge that is not
empirically saturated,  James circumvents the latter by means of  a  scientist  cognitive
theory of knowledge (MW 12: 205).  One could therefore also say that their respective
emergent  ideas  differ  in  that  Durkheim  used  a  conceptual  principle  to  create  a
connection to life-worldly practices, while James invoked a functionalist principle based
on vitalism. 
 
2. The Epistemological Centrality of Experience and
Practice: Dewey and Bourdieu
19 John Dewey and Pierre Bourdieu, in their respective fields of philosophy and sociology,
were keys in lending a specific epistemological meaning to “practice.” In his last lectures
at  the  Collège  de  France  on the  epistemological  goal  of  the  idea  of  the  social  field,
Bourdieu  defined  it  as  a  combination  of  a  comparative  method  and  a  dispositional
philosophy  of  action  (Bourdieu  2001:  68).  The  dispositionality  of  action  is  an  idea
Bourdieu began formulating in the 1960s within the framework of his field theory as sens
pratique up  to  his  concept  of  habitus,  which  stresses  the  dynamic  and  processual
incorporation of social knowledge. Asked in 1987 the extent to which his ideas coincided
with the American tradition of pragmatism, Bourdieu answered: 
Indeed,  the  affinities  and  convergences  are  quite  striking  […].  [T]he  theory  of
practical sense presents many similarities with theories, such as Dewey’s, that grant
a central role to the notion of habit, understood as an active and creative relation
to the world, and reject all the conceptual dualisms upon which nearly all post-
Cartesian philosophies are based: subject and object, internal and external, material
and spiritual, individual and social, and so on. (Bourdieu-Wacquant 1992c: 122)
20 In this statement, Bourdieu specifies two decisive intersections: the rejection of a dualist,
reductionist, purely  metaphysical  theory  of  knowledge,  also  Durkheim’s  and  James’
starting point, and the importance of the concept of dispositional practical sense, in the
meaning of a performative creative action option also inherent in his idea of habit and
especially  –  as  I  will  examine  in  further  detail  below  –  in  Dewey’s  active  experience
(experimentation). Dewey describes James’ legacy in this area as having in pragmatism laid
the foundation to be able to “recognize that experience is an intimate union of emotion
and knowledge” (LW 15: 17).
 
2.1 Experimental Thought and Practice as a Method of Knowledge 
21 John Dewey’s entire oeuvre is characterized by a deep exploration of experience, practice
and knowledge. He concentrates on the connections between naturalistic/natural science
instruments of knowledge and a philosophy of action and practice informed by Peirce and
James. This is particulary obvious in his pioneer works on experimental psychology and
his famous paper on “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896). Similar to James, he
accuses modern philosophy of generally ignoring functional thought. He contrasts it with
an empirical theory of ideas that he holds up as one of the most important achievements
in the history of ideas, able to bring about the true liberation of thought, because the
“definition of the nature of ideas in terms of operations to be performed and the test of
the validity of the ideas by the consequences of these operations establishes connectivity
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within concrete experience.  At the same time,  by emancipation of thinking from the
necessity of testing its conclusions solely by reference to antecedent existence it makes
clear  the  originative  possibilities  of  thinking”  (LW 4:  92).  For  all  pragmatists,  and
especially for Dewey and George Herbert Mead, Darwins evolutionary theory inspired and
justified  the  importance  of  functionalism  not  only  within  the  natural  and  the  life
sciences, but also for philosophy and psychology. The groundbreaking changes in the
ways  knowledge  was  acquired  brought  about  by  modern  natural  sciences  and  the
consequent necessity of transcending the dualism of theory and practice are ideas Dewey
explores in The Quest for Certainty. A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (LW 4).
According  to  Dewey,  the  dichotomy of  practice  and theory  in  which the  identity of
occidental  philosophy  was  grounded  stems  from  psychological  and  anthropological
uncertainties which made the “quest for cognitive certainty” the most urgent task and
can thus be seen as the origin of the development of theory divorced from practice and
empiricism. However  in  the  modern  era,  experimental  empiricism  and  operational
thought gained ascendancy in the natural sciences and final leave was taken from the
idea of a tangible reality beyond the realm of empirical fact or, as Dewey called it, from a
“spectator  theory of  knowledge.  […]  For  science in becoming experimental  has  itself
become a mode of directed practical doing” (LW 4: 20). From this, Dewey concludes that 
the consequences of substituting search for security by practical means for quest of
absolute certainty by cognitive means will then be considered in its bearing upon
the  problem  of  our  judgments  regarding  the  values  which  control  conduct,
especially its social phases. (LW 4: 20)
22 Knowledge is thus for Dewey a specific moment of experience (or “event”), similar to
James’  pure  experience;  however  neither,  as  in  James,  in  a  vitalist  sense  nor,  as  in
Durkheim,  in the sense of  an ordering moment;  for  Dewey,  knowledge is  rather  the
cognitive equivalent to practical research (West 1989b: 188). At the same time, Dewey
protested against all forms of naive positivism. Rather he pleads for “a philosophy of
experience [which] may be empirical without either being false to actual experience or
being compelled to explain away the values dearest to the heart of  man” (LW 4:  86).
Similar  to  James,  experience  and  practice  close  the  gap  between  rationalism  and
empiricism, however Dewey preferences practice as a inexhaustible source of inspiration
for knowledge, particularly in its close tie to more empirical experience: 
In reaction against the age-long depreciation of practice in behalf of contemplative
knowledge,  there  is  a  temptation  simply  to  turn  things  upside  down.  But  the
essence of pragmatic instrumentalism is to conceive of both knowledge and practice
as  means  of  making  goods  –  excellencies  of  all  kinds  –  secure  in  experienced
existence. (LW 4: 30)12
23 As Andreas Hetzel has aptly noted, Dewey thus follows, similar to James, a “strategy of
degrounding  practice”  which  rejects  the  “transcendental  philosophical  question  of
metapractical grounds for practice” (Hetzel 2008: 38).
24 Although  he  himself  remains  a  philosopher,  Dewey  connects  philosophical
epistemological  ambitions with a sociological  and genealogical  perspective.  From this
Dewey  concludes  that  experience  and  practice  are  the  categories  par  excellence  for
constituting reality for ”’practical’ means the future responses which an object requires
of us or commits us to” (MW 4: 102). Hetzel remarks on Dewey’s and James’ use of the
term practice: “Practice is never completely itself; it acts rather upon something else and
defines itself by means of this effectiveness, by means of cause and effect. Theory is not
the other of practice, but can be described as a gestalt or figure of this self-difference of
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practice” (Hetzel 2008: 18-9). This idea of practice is reminiscent of Karsenti’s analysis of
Durkheim’s understanding of practice, as opposed to knowledge, as being informed by a
theory of  differentiation.  Practice,  because it  does not only signify human action for
futurity,  but  is  also  the  expression  of  the  uncertain  provisional  nature  of  “active
knowledge,” is two-sided – both durable and permeable: “The realm of the practical,”
Dewey wrote, “is the region of change, and change is always contingent; it has in it an
element of chance that cannot be eliminated” (LW 4: 16). Dewey’s concept of practice
questions universalistic and reason-centered definitions of knowledge in the tradition of
his predecessor James’ radical empiricism, but he hones this concept much more clearly
than James in the direction of a social reformist theory of action, a social philosophy of
action  concerned primarily  with  showing  “how the  actual  procedures  of  knowledge,
interpreted after the pattern formed by experimental  inquiry,  cancel  the isolation of
knowledge  from overt  action”  (Dewey 1930:  49).  Dewey thus  implicitly  takes  up  the
holistic connection of knowledge and action criticized by Durkheim in James’ theory, by
attempting to empirically connect them in the social Lebenswelt, in order to find answers
to social questions. Bourdieu also makes this empirical association.
25 Pierre  Bourdieu’s  practice  theory  arose  as  both  an  extension  of  and  alternative  to
Durkheim’s  sociologie  de  l’action.  While  Bourdieu shared Durkheim’s  insistence  on the
power of social structures, on objectivity and against all forms of spontaneous sociology
as well as his genealogical and relational methodology; he departed from Durkheim in his
criticism of a theory-practice dichotomy. If the social subject is inextricably connected to
his environment, which in turn helps structure his bodily and historical socialization,
then, in Bourdieu’s view, a conflict remains that Durkheim ignored: The social division of
labor stems not only from the “neutral” ground of differentiation and association, but
also  on  the  basis  of  the  epistemological  conflict  between  theory  and  practice  also
criticized by Dewey. However Bourdieu’s concept of practice is oriented towards Marx’s
critique of  domination,  which studies  the social  division of  theory and practice as  a
fundamental  and  antagonistic  contradiction  of  capitalist  societies.  For  the
anthropological  Marx,  this  critique  of  domination  means  locating  the  constitutive
heterogeneity of thought and action so as to create the conditions for overcoming them.
In this way Marx also sees thought as another form of social practice, as a non-practice
which led to the differentiation of social classes. But how can we grasp this contradiction
between practice and non-practice? 
26 Bourdieu’s critique follows Marx in the respect that he believes that to comprehend this
antagonism, a theoretical  construct of  the structures which produced it  is  necessary.
Therefore “a theory is needed that looks at the structures from which it comes and which
have produced it, without which it cannot see what has caused it. This means that to truly
think about social structures […] it is necessary to think about the preconditions for the
separation of practice and theory” (Karsenti 2011: 109). This realization of the necessity
of  a theoretical  construct is  at  the same time a distrust of  its  dominance.  From this
Bourdieu  articulated  his  genetic  or  constructivist  structuralism  as  opposed  to  the
structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Similar to Durkheim, an
emergence theory concept of  structures can be seen in Bourdieu – structures in the
process  of  becoming,  dynamic  “functional  phenomena” which  James  associated  with
perceptual  consciousness.  This  emergence  theory  perspective  is  exhibited  in  the
interplay that Bourdieu sees between experiences (dispositions), practices, habitus and
social structure: “The habitus which, at every moment, structures new experiences in
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accordance with the structures produced by past experiences, which are modified by the
new experiences within the limits defined by their power of selection, brings about a
unique integration” (Bourdieu 2002: 284).  Experiences and practices can, according to
Bourdieu,  not  only  transcend  the  dualism  between  rationalism  and  empiricism  (as
Durkheim noted in his critique of James), but they are also subject to the fact of social
inequality.  Thus Bourdieu’s theory of practice,  influenced by Marx, receives a critical
function  inherent  in  Durkheim’s  practical  model  of  differentiation  by  acting  on  the
political  level  of  “distinction.” Experience,  practice and knowledge are,  for Bourdieu,
inseparable from the attempt to transcend the division of theory and practice in the
humanities; he thus throws both Durkheim’s and Dewey’s critique of dualism into relief
and  adds  a  political  dimension.  Unlike  Durkheim,  who  searched  for  a  collective
consciousness  that  first  makes  social  reality  possible,  Bourdieu  concentrates  on  the
reproductive mechanisms of a reality that is not only contingent, but also, due to the
dualism of theory and practice, highly conflict-ridden. Bourdieu agrees with Durkheim
that knowledge and reality must exhibit a certain degree of homogeneity so that social
experience  and  disposition  can  assert  themselves  as  rules  at  all.  But  in  contrast  to
Durkheim and Dewey, who both created interventionist theories within a social reform
approach, Bourdieu understood the break with common sense not only as a methodological
necessity, but also as a critique of domination. 
27 The concomitant danger of a structural theoretical determinism is mitigated by the fact
that Bourdieu’s concept of practice is not only Marxist, but also anthropological; practice
originates in the body. In its practice theory dimension, “practice” means the meeting of
the body with the world; a body that is both invariant and performative in its materiality.
13 In  this  context,  Bourdieu  refers  to  the  generative  and  performative  principle  of
practices. The epistemological ambitions of this dynamic idea of practice become clearer
in their close connection to the concept of habitus which stems from a specific idea of
experiences – a dispositionalist philosophy of practice – an idea that can also be found in
Dewey’s concept of experience.
 
2.2 Experience / Dispositionality / Habitus
28 The central importance of experience to Dewey’s work is particularly clear in “Experience
and Nature.” In it, he calls his philosophy not “pragmatism,” but “empirical naturalism”
or “naturalistic empiricism” (LW 1: 10) and bases it on the preeminent position of human
experience (LW 1: 11), a naturalistic, genealogical, fundamental principle already found in
James’ radical empiricism. How does Dewey define experience differently from James and
Durkheim? Which critique of consciousness and epistemological elements is it based on? 
29 For  Dewey,  experience  is  both  an  imminent  and  an  external  phenomena,  it  is  the
foundation of things: “Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has
breadth  and  to  an  indefinitely  elastic  extent.  It  stretches.  That  stretch  constitutes
inference” (LW 1: 13). In contrast to Durkheim, Dewey locates experience in the whole
world –  here too he links  to  James’  radical  empiricist  “pure experience” and to the
connective relationships between objects, people and experiences. Dewey distinguishes
between  James’  psychological  scientific  philosophy  and  speculative  philosophy  (see
MW 12: 203 ff.; LW 15: 3 ff.), but in contrast to James he emphasizes the sociological and
genealogical importance of collective experience and association. He explicitly criticizes
the contraposition of individual and society as an artificial opposition which obscures the
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true challenges of the modern era; the “reconstruction of the ways and forms in which
men unite in associated activity” in times of rapid social change – a challenge located not
between the individual and association, but within them (Dewey 1954: 191). Similar to
Durkheim, Dewey concedes that there is a parallel between historical differentiation and
association that are, in his opinion, relevant to a theory of practice: “A distinctive way of
behaving in conjunction and connection with other distinctive ways of acting, independent
of every else, is that toward which we are pointed” (Dewey 1954: 188). 
30 While  Bourdieu  believed  social  distinction  to  be  the  society  forming  category  par
excellence and examined it  as  such,  he  locates  experience  more  implicitly  within  his
theories of disposition, practical sense and habitus, which he often used interchangeably
and  does  not  consistently  distinguish  from  one  another  (see  Bouveresse  1999:  52).
Bourdieu gave up his more explicit term for the importance of experience to behavior
and the contingent uncertainty of behavior, hysteresis,  more or less completely in the
course of his work for the more structurally-oriented concept of habitus. Because of its
specific  function,  particularly  relating  theory  and practice  to  one  another,  Bourdieu
defines habitus among other things as “history turned into nature” (see Bourdieu 1977:
78)  and  as  a  system  of  disposition.  In  this  sense,  the  sens  pratique,  the  relational
praxeological knowledge expressed via habitus, locates experience/disposition, akin to
James’ and Dewey’s theories, as an anthropological category in opposition to objectivism.
Bourdieu  defines  disposition as  the  precondition  to  reflection  and  action  based  in
experience, both psychologically/mentally as well as structurally and thus, as in Dewey,
beyond the artificial dichotomy of individual and society. The term disposition “expresses
first the result of a organizing action with a meaning close to words such as structure; it
also designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular,
a predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination” (Bourdieu 1977: 214). “Dispositions
[are] acquired through experience” (Bourdieu 1990: 9). Elsewhere, Bourdieu speaks of the
“homogeneity of conditions, of conditionings, and thus of dispositions” (Bourdieu 1990:
129), or of the “dispositions of agents […], that is their mental structures” experienced by
subjects as the long-term occupation of a position (Bourdieu 1990: 130-1).  In this last
definition, the function of disposition within his “genetic structuralism” becomes clear:
the long-term occupation of a social position, a social inheritance, becomes a disposition
founded on Leibniz’s mode of relational thinking, which Bourdieu referred to repeatedly
(see Bouveresse 1999: 47ff.) and which also influenced James’ definition of experience.
Between  habitus  expressed  as  action  and  disposition  Bourdieu  sees  an  “ontological
complicity” (Bourdieu 1990: 12) that anticipates structure; this expresses the function of
the sens pratique and is reminiscent of Dewey’s definition of practice. The generalizing
capabilities of dispositions are hereby not one of a transcendental subject such as found
in the idealist tradition, but of an acting and creative agent (Bourdieu 1990: 12). 
31 The terminological intersections of disposition, practical sense and practice subsumed by
Bourdieu under the concept of habitus also however reveal the fundamental problem of
his theory of structure and practice: It is difficult to know when a disposition is more
likely to reproduce existing structures and has a stabilizing function and when it is the
starting  point  for  a  change  in  what  is  structurally  predetermined.  The  embodied,
performative and transposable nature of habitus (“art of inventing,” see Bourdieu 2002:
279)  that  Bourdieu  emphasizes as  a  defense  against  the  accusation  of  structural
determinism contradicts the duration, persistence and stabilizing tendency ascribed to
Experiencing Practical Knowledge
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV - 1 | 2012
13
the dispositions it is founded on. Is this an insoluble antagonism, tilted towards structural
dominance? 
32 To determine this, in the context of the definition for disposition Bourdieu himself gave,
we must clarify the role of the critique of consciousness, which also motivated James’ and
Durkheim’s  epistemologies.  In  contrast  to  the  importance  of  the  social  unconscious
frequently stressed by Bourdieu, his social theories and in particular the practical sense
are often, incidentally similar to pragmatism, understood as close to utilitarian theories
(Honneth 1984, Joas & Knöbl 2004, Dalton 2004) – a reading that rests on the vagueness
surrounding the position of consciousness in Bourdieu. Paradoxically, this arises from the
creative,  performative opening  of  the  idea  of  habitus  in  contrast  to  structural
determinism,  which  Bourdieu  often  brings  into  an  inauspicious  coalition  with  the
strategic orientation of agents, as if agents acted strategically according to the logic of
practice  most  advantageous  to  them.  The  equation  of  a  practical  sense  founded  on
dispositions with “pre-logical thinking” (Bourdieu 2003: 49) led to further confusion, as
this seemed to provide grounds for the conclusion that the sens pratique is located in the
realm of the unconscious, a blatant contradiction to his writings on strategic action. It is
worth noting that Bourdieu also states that dispositions ignore experiences in thought,
but not in practice (Bourdieu 2002: 278), concordant with James’ and Dewey’s idea of the
supremacy of  practice  over  knowledge.  From this  however  does  not  follow strategic
action, but the idea that dispositions which inform the action – the sens pratique – belong
in the sphere of the infra-conscious, as Karsenti has shown (Karsenti 2011: 122). For this
reason alone, habitus is neither located completely in the conscious sphere or in the
unconscious  sphere,  because  it  always  operates  on  a  specific  level  of  consciousness,
namely at an intermediate level. It is both a passive and an active category. The same is
true  of  experience  anchored  in  habitus.  From  this  viewpoint,  Bourdieu’s
conceptualization of experience is the epistemological equivalent to William James’
criticism of the concept of consciousness widely held in his times. Although James posited
experience in opposition to (metaphysical) consciousness, he did allow for consciousness
in a  practical  sense  –  recognizing its  function for knowledge.  However  this  leads  to
utilitarianism just as little as Bourdieu’s sens pratique does. In this way, Bourdieu’s theory
of disposition and practical sense, understood as working at an infra-conscious level, just
as  James’  theory  of  experience,  could  make  the  connection  necessary  to  assign
consciousness  with  an  equally  pre-logical  epistemic  value,  manifested  between  the
conscious and the unconscious, therefore decisively physical and mental. 
33 Missing  in  Bourdieu  however,  and  ubiquitous  in  pragmatism,  is  the  search  for
explanations for structures of emergence and adaptation within social differentiation and
the spaces of possibility they create. With the exception of his study on the sociology of
art (Bourdieu 1992a) Bourdieu seldom discusses the interaction of specific practices and
social structures regarding new or contingent experiences, action options or forms of
practice. My thesis is that to do so, we need an emergence theory perspective to hone the
practice theory and pragmatist concepts of “knowledge,” “experience” and “practice,” as
I outline in my conclusion.
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3. Conclusion: Social Emergence Theory as a Point of
Convergence?
34 Bruno Karsentis’  aforementioned  thesis  –  that  Durkheim’s  sociologie  de  l’action is  the
sociological counterpart to James’  radical empiricism – can be corroborated from the
viewpoint of  emergence theory.  James’  radical  empiricism poses the question of  how
experience and knowledge are constituted. His epistemological interest, building on the
category of experience, is focused on objects in the process of becoming. According to
James, the validity of philosophical scientific truth can only be seen in practice, in its
empirical connection to the natural world. Emergence theory takes an ontological holistic
approach  to  this  issue;  Durkheim takes  a  more  social  holistic  approach.  Durkheim’s
sociologie de l’action thus positions itself as an emergence theory alternative to radical
empiricism in which experience and consciousness are historically saturated due to their
collectivity.  It  is  distinguished  by  a  process  of  differentiation  characterized  by  the
interdependence  of  evolving  structures  (social  morphology)  and  practices  (social
physiology).  Both  vary  accordingly  between  naturalist  and  constructivist  motifs.
Although James’ epistemological contribution to a grounding “experience” in practice
helped  bring  sociological  perspectives  into  philosophy,14 his  definition  of  practice
remained epistemological and his understanding of experience was mostly individualist.
Durkheim for his part did not see the dualism of theory and practice as an opportunity to
connect  his  emergence  theory  understanding  of  the  concept  of  “association”  with  a
critique of consciousness grounded in practice theory. Dewey however does make this
connection. Dewey continues James’ work by studying the non-causality of practice and
its  irreducibility  to  a  rational  or  empirical  subject.  He  expands  James’  critique  of
consciousness  by  describing  knowledge  as  a  transactional  process  based  on  active,
experimental  experiences.  His  criticism of  the  dissociation  of  individual  and  society
resulted in a concept of collective associations very close to emergence theory. 
35 The critique of consciousness expressed by James, Durkheim and Dewey by means of the
concept of experience is reformulated in the late modern era in Bourdieu’s sens pratique.15
In James and Dewey, experience – in the sense of mental, internalized infra-conscious
knowledge – manifests itself through different series of associations (James 1922: 9 ff.,
LW 1: 266-7), while in Bourdieu’s practical sense, which also reproduces the experiences
people  have  on  an  infra-conscious  level,  experience  contributes  to  the  dynamic
organization of reality. The potential of Bourdieu’s sociology for emergence theory lies in
his method of relating disposition, practices and social structures to one another; they
enter  empirical  interdependencies  and  produce  specific  social  experiences.  However
Bourdieu failed to take the necessary step of emergence theory that explains how the
interaction of specific practices and social structures lead to the creation of new social
fields. 
36 Here,  James’  and  Dewey’s  emphasis  on  non-originality,  the  tendency  towards
unpredictability as well as the creative, optional and anticipatory character of practice is
quite useful, as Bourdieu himself conceded with regard to the sens pratique. In this area,
the concept of practice approaches a core concept of emergence theory with respect to its
effect on experience and knowledge: Unlike the concept of action, the concept of practice,
in  Bourdieu’s  Marxist-influenced  terminology  as  well  as in  pragmatic  philosophy,
emphasizes,  as  Stefan  Beck  has  noted,  the  “state  of  tension  between  stability  and
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variation” which is of central importance to an emergence theory perspective. “Practice
[…] in Marxist anthropology and in Dewey’s pragmatic idea of action is conceptualized in
terms  of  how it  acts  upon  the  self  and  upon  the  world  (Selbst-  and  Welteinwirkung)
whereby processuality and situativity represent  two decisive analytic  categories” (Beck
1996: 339). Similar to James’ notion of pure experience, the open-ended complexity of
practice in the context of its development is revealed. The emergent characteristics of
social phenomena produced by practice become empirically visible as externally aimed
effects,  typified by a  tendency to be unpredictable.  Darwins non-teleogical  argument
considering  the  evolution  of  life  translated  into  the  concept  of  experience  by  the
pragmatists requires it’s full legacy here, as Menand stresses: “Relations will be more
important than categories, functions, which are variable, will be more important than
purposes,  which  are  fixed  in  advance;  transitions  will  be  more  important  than
boundaries;  sequences will  be more important than hierarchies” (Menand 2002:  124).
Here we could dissipate some epistemological tracks of a pragmatism that became later
on interactionism and ethnomethodology (Emirbayer & Maynard 2010).
37 This associative and collective character of practice and its basic performance arises from
the interdependent linkages within the social fabric that goes beyond the idea of the self-
organization dynamic of procedures quoted in the definition of emergence promoted by
Krohn and Küppers. Moreover, it corresponds with John H. Holland’s understanding of
emergence as a “product of coupled, context-dependent interactions” (Holland in Beck
2007: 124-5). Sawyer, in his study on social emergence, goes even further: “The science of
social emergence is the basic science underlying all of the social sciences because social
emergence is  foundational  to  all  of  them” (Sawyer 2005: 189).  At  the same time,  he
protests against creating a new general theoretical paradigm: “The Emergence Paradigm
does not propose any definite answers to long-standing sociological questions, but it has
significant implications for how sociological theory and methodology should proceed”
(Sawyer 2005: 229). Thus emergence theory offers a useful approach to the pragmatic
development  of  practice  theory as  both concepts  see  themselves  both as  theories  of
knowledge and at the same time as empirical,  experimental  research methods.  In an
interview  entitled  “Fieldwork  in  Philosophy”  in  a  reference  to  J. L. Austin,  Bourdieu
claimed it is necessary to have a pragmatic view of that “culture par excellence, namely
philosophy” (Bourdieu 1990: 29).16 Perhaps now the time has come to apply this premise
to Bourdieu’s theory of practice.
38 In  Belgian  philosopher  Didier  Debaise’s  etymologic  definition,  the  affinity  between
‘practice’ and ‘pragma’ is obvious: “‘Pragma’,” he says, “means both, ‘experience’ and
‘praxein’ which means ‘acting,’ ‘doing’ or even ‘performing’” (Debaise 2005). Nevertheless
the epistemological dimensions and methodological consequences of the conflation of
these categories as “experience,” “practice” and “performance” (in the sense of creative
action) remain unclear as regards their meaning for cognitive and social freedom and the
finiteness  of  human  action.  Following  Debaise,  ‘pragma’  includes  practice, which  is
merely a specific expression of pragma accompanied by experience. So the difference
between pragmatism and practice theory probably lies in the translation of experience
into a performative interpretation. 
39 Dealing with experience means for Bourdieu neither reduction, nor pure reproduction,
but  the  limitation  of  creativity  by  the  habitus  as  an  integration  system  that  gives
experiences  their  intrinsic  coherence.  Experience in  Bourdieu’s  sense is  a  process  of
accumulation and integration.  Innovation is  immediately absorbed by the integrating
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activity of knowledge production. This process of accumulation and integration is in itself
endlessly creative, as Bourdieu acknowledges following Chomsky’s model of generative
grammar,  but  the  practices  it  produces  are  greatly  limited  by  social  constraints.  In
contrast,  in  pragmatist  thought,  experience,  and  in  particular  “experimentation”
describes  an  activity  that  is  much  more  instable,  unpredictable  and  ambiguous.  As
Debaise  points  out:  “Pragmatism  presents  itself  as  a  technical  reflection  upon
experimentation.  This technique takes two forms:  the evaluation of  the propositions,
utterances,  and  ideas  through  their  effects;  the  construction  and  invention  of  new
propositions in charge of accounting for experimentation as a continuous movement of
changes and transformations” (Debaise 2005). The practices arising from experimentation
are  basically  emergent,  as  they  appear  as  qualitatively  new  forms  of  symbolic  and
material complexity empirically embodied in human action.
40 In  this  regard,  I  believe  that  sociological  action  theory  should  today  focus  more
concretely on the empirical  foundation of knowledge production in regards to actors
specific dispositions, forms of experimentation and emergent practices. By stressing the
idea of emergence, human action (or practice) could be understood as a dynamic that
highlights and reflects the social persistence of established patterns of assumptions as
well  as  possibilities  for  innovation  and change.  But  in  contrast  to  established social
theories that have already developed around the social impact of emergence, such as
those of Niklas Luhman, the conflation of practice theory and pragmatism forces us to
recast  emergence within qualitative and quantitative observation and methodological
reflections on our proper practice as social scientists. Furthermore, both practice theory
and pragmatism take a critical analytical stance which concedes a “relative autonomy”
(Marx) to social agents as regards their ability to perform their life trajectories. Observing
the dynamics of  differentiation in contemporary Lebenswelten,  we must deal  with the
concomitance  of  reproduction  and  emergence.  More  precisely,  I  suspect  that  a
combination  of  practice  theory  and  pragmatism  shall  show  a  dynamic  interrelation
between the categories sens pratique – disposition – reproduction – experience – emergence.
Bourdieu’s anthropological category of sens pratique is as suitable for the study of social
change as the emergent categories of association and experience formulated by James
and Dewey, especially on the question of critical action. The problem of the dichotomy of
reflective knowledge and practical knowledge could be resolved by a pragmatist approach
without  abandoning the  methodological  equipment  of  practice  theory.  In  short,  the
particularities of acting by recasting models of specific dispositions in specific situations
(or social fields) could be comprehended, depending on the degree of generalization, by
applying  both  structural  analysis  and  an  analysis  of  emergent  processes.  Thus,  it  is
possible to articulate the anti-deterministic perspective defended by Bourdieu’s sociology
and by pragmatism in a manner that stops considering social reproduction and social
emergence as mutually exclusive phenomena. By focusing on the idea of emergence in
the sense of an empirically based process of knowledge, ‘practice’ could be understood as
a fundamental social dynamic that highlights and reflects the persistence of established
social norms and patterns of assumption as well as the possibility of difference, critique,
innovation and hence social change.
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NOTES
1. For a discussion on a combination of practice theory and pragmatism in order to develop a
contemporary theory of social mechanisms, see Gross 2009; for a discussion on Pierre Bourdieu’s
and John Dewey’s approaches to critical activities through the lenses of the French pragmatic
sociology of critique, see Thévenot 2001.
2. Krohn and Küpper precede “appearance” with the adverb “sudden,” which I have left out.
Particularly  from  a  pragmatic/practice  theory  perspective  –  and  especially  in  regard  to  the
positions examined here – the processuality of emergent phenomena is always conceivable over
a longer period of time (durée). This becomes clearer in the following analysis of the four authors’
positions.
3. This is however in dispute in current discourse on pragmatic philosophy and is for example
partially  contested  by  Bruno  Latour,  Didier  Debaise,  Jean-Christophe  Goddard  and  Pierre
Montebello. The “non-anthropological” interpretation of pragmatism, particularly in France, is
currently  undergoing  a  reinterpretation  with  an  eye  towards  the  life  sciences  and technical
philosophy  prompted  by  Gabriel  Tarde  on  Henri  Bergson,  William  James,  and  Alfred  North
Whitehead on Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze.
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4. A similar view is  found in Joas regarding the agreement of Durkheim and pragmatism on
building a “theory of the social constitution of the fundamental category of knowledge” (Joas
1993: 267). However in my opinion this is less true of James who (unlike Durkheim) does not
extrapolate from the dualism of practice and knowledge, but radically circumvents the difference
between thought and action by preferencing the concept of experience. It is thus presumably
experience (Joas 1993: 261) that needs to be questioned as a radical empiricist and sociological
term.
5. On the contemporary form of the empirical turn see Joas (1993: 261-2).
6. An  excurses  on  Durkheim’s  exploration  of  James’  “Principles  of  Psychology”  which  runs
through his pragmatism lectures would shed more light on this. While some sociologists tended
to see psychology primarily as a area of demarcation (particularly true of Pierre Janet’s  und
Gabriel  Tardes’  psychologie  sociale),  Durkheim and his  student  Maurice  Halbwachs’  psychologie
collective repeatedly  stresses  the  importance  of  psychological  knowledge  for  a  sociological
analysis (Durkheim 1953: 1-34; Bastide 1958).
7. Here I follow Steven Luke’s argument that Durkheim replaced the term “crystallization” with
the term “institution” or uses them synonymously. 
8. Accordingly, it is possible to interpret Durkheim’s statement that sociology is the science of
institutions from an emergence theory perspective: Sociology is at the same time a science for
studying  institutionalizing  (Castoriadis)  evolving  phenomena,  “associations,”  as  wells  as
stabilizing institutions in the meaning of material and moral structures.
9. The term “relative autonomy” already appears in early Marx and is later taken up again by
Bourdieu (see Bourdieu 1992: 26; Bogusz 2007: 18ff.).
10. Around 1900, “les arts” was a synonym for practice, Durkheim’s supporter Espinas uses the
terms interchangeably (Espinas 1897).
11. A criticism that however has no impact, as Joas has shown (see Joas 1993: 263ff.).
12. In Art as Experience (LW 10) Dewey describes the aesthetic character of the “experience of
thinking.”
13. The  interconnection  of  body  and  practice  suggests  epistemological  parallels  between
Bourdieu and Marcel Mauss (Moebius 2009).
14. This also explains Bruno Latour’s proximity to James and Dewey, however in his critique of
Durkheim  he  completely  ignores  Durkheim’s  emergence  theory  approach,  which  leads  to  a
significant distortion of Durkheim’s social theory.
15. It remains an open question whether Bourdieu might have been able to build this criticism
more solidly if he had stayed with the term hysteresis. 
16. Curiously, this passage is missing in the German translation (Bourdieu 1992b).
ABSTRACTS
The classical philosophy of American pragmatism has experienced a striking renaissance within
the social sciences during the last decade especially in France and Germany. My essay takes this
development  as  a  starting  point  to  propose  a  historical  and  epistemological  combination  of
pragmatism and sociological practice theory from an anthropological viewpoint. In the long run
this  combination  is  not  only  supposed  to  overcome their  pretended  incommensurateness  in
social  theory,  but  to  consolidate  their  methodological  convergences,  which,  while  actually
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reclaimed in international social and cultural anthropology, still wait to be applied in a more
systematic relation. Hence, the essay examines their respective approaches concerning knowledge
, action and the importance of experience starting with William James and Émile Durkheim (1). In
a second step, the concepts of experience and practice in the works of John Dewey and Pierre
Bourdieu  will  be  compared  one  to  another  (2).  The  essay  finishes  by  outlining  a  possible
combination based on emergence theory that still has to be developped (3).
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